

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. The President's letter and subsequent NIA Directives have given to the Director of Central Intelligence responsibility in three broad fields:


- a. Operation of centralized activities.
- b. Coordination of decentralized activities.
- c. Production of strategic and national policy intelligence.

2. As you are undoubtedly aware, I do not consider that CIG has developed with the speed which I had hoped for when I first became Director of Central Intelligence and I feel it my duty to report to you what I consider are the causes for these delays:

a. In the field of centralized activities I have been retarded by an uncertainty existing among the agencies as to the permanency of the Central Intelligence Group. CIG now operates under a Presidential Directive. It can be abolished by a Presidential Directive. The Federal Judge for Honolulu has challenged the legality of such Presidential Directive agencies. I was, therefore, pleased when Mr. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, requested in December that I submit a draft of proposed legislation in the belief that legislation will remove one of the principal obstacles to the most desirable centralization. Assurance of permanency will also facilitate our personnel recruitment. Despite this uncertainty, however, we are now operating the following centralized activities:

- (1) Special Operations.

FOIAb3b1



- (3) A Central Contact Register to coordinate the exploitation of U. S. business and other U. S. groups and U. S. individuals

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

having connections abroad. (Consideration is being given to extending this to include aliens arriving in this country.)

(4) Exploitation of documents collected in the Far East.

(We now are completing plans for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.)

(5) Central Biographic File.

b. Coordination of decentralized activities has been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(1) The President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission."

(Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946.)

(2) The National Intelligence Authority specified that: "Recommendations approved by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NIA Directive No. 1, par. 4.)

(3) The NIA also specified that: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3.)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(h) In attempting to carry out this coordinating responsibility I have found among agency representatives a constant desire to deny that the NIA granted any directive authority to the Director of Central Intelligence. In the beginning I proposed the development of basic plans for the coordination in the three fundamental fields of (1) collection; (2) production of finished intelligence and; (3) dissemination. It immediately became evident that agency representatives were reluctant to tackle these major problems, resolution of which might effect their internal procedures. They requested that attention be given instead to the 30 or more isolated problems which they had referred to CIG. Some of these problems were then attacked but no sound solutions could be found in the absence of agreement on basic principles of coordination. No agency was willing to have its own house affected although anxious to see improvement elsewhere. So we returned to a more concerted attack on the three basic plans. Regularly one or another agency representative, both at the committee and IAB level requested the deletion of any wording indicating the existence of a directive authority for the coordinator. G-2 and ONI constantly referred to threatened interference with their command channels. No changes could be made which might conflict with standing orders and procedures. State emphasized the "cooperative nature" of CIG and interpreted this to require unanimous concurrence in all details. This procedure of development by compromise resulted in papers so emasculated as to be almost worthless. I then tried getting IAB agreement on statements of "overall policies and objectives" within the terms of which I would undertake positive coordination of agency activities. The IAB would not formally approve these,

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

although agreeing to their worth, without a knowledge of the proposed implementing directives. Agency disagreement immediately developed and detailed discussion of implementing procedures renewed.

(5) CIG was created to do a construction job of coordination in the interests of effectiveness and efficiency. It cannot do this job under the present interpretation of the term coordination - which is taken to preclude directive authority. The current interpretation of coordination as "by mutual agreement" places the Director of Central Intelligence in the position of an Executive Secretary to the IAB and makes his appointment by the President incongruous.

(6) I invite your attention to the authority given to the Joint Research and Development Board: "The Joint Research and Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as an agency of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the Board so that its decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such." (JRDB 1/1, 6 June 1946, as amended 3 July 1946). I therefore recommend that similar authority be given to CIG.

g. The production of strategic and national policy intelligence has been hindered by an uncertainty among the agencies as to what the term means. By research into its origins, that is the papers and discussions preceding the issuance of the President's letter, CIG has developed the following definition which I request that you approve: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department." I also request that you go on record as approving my decision that CIG must do some original research in the production of strategic and national policy intelligence, although relying as much as practicable on research already done by the several agencies. Some question on this point has been already raised by the agencies.

3. The following problems confronting me do not easily fall into any one of the above three broad fields, but I believe should be brought to your attention:

a. CIG relationship to the JCS. It is my understanding that those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the Central Intelligence Group would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, as you know, has not taken place nor has any working relationship been achieved. The JIC continues to have responsibilities paralleling those of CIG. Until this is resolved complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission cannot be attained.

b. Scientific intelligence. I am discussing with the Joint Research and Development Board and with the Atomic Energy Commission means of coordinating the Government's intelligence activities in the scientific field. Prompt agreement to CIG responsibility for intelligence support in this important field is essential to the national security.

TOP SECRET